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The Perils of Online Legal Research:
A Caveat for Diligent Counsel
J. Thomas Sullivant
Abstract
Online legal research is emerging as a preferred tool for judges,
attorneys, and lawstudents, providing a vast amount ofnearly real-time
legal resources at the speed of electronic search. This Article analyzes
the risk of error associated with the immediacy of online opinion pub-
lishing and how the uncertainty ofaccuracy potentially compromises the
litigator's ability to provide accurate advice.
Introduction
All lawyers are by now undoubtedly aware of the extent to which
technological developments impact practice. Some of these affect the
way everyone does business, such as the prevalence of cell phones, voice-
mail, fax machines, and photocopiers in every office. These develop-
ments are hardly unique to law practices and courts, of course, and often
simply require judges, clerks, and attorneys to learn how to effectively
integrate new technology into the pre-existing regime for performing
duties and mundane activities.
A more important consideration at the heart of the practice of law and
the work of courts resides in the digital revolution that has transformed
the processes of announcing and accessing the law.' Practicing lawyers
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For an interesting philosophical assessment on the way in which technology is
shaping legal research, see Robert C. Berring, Legal Research and the World of Think-
able Thoughts, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 305 (2000). Professor Berring argues that
the digital revolution not only impacts legal research, but also the way in which legal
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are now heavily invested in online research, using a variety of databases.2
Perhaps the most used online research tools are commercial libraries, such
as Westlaw and LexisNexis, but other search engines are increasingly
available, including court-sponsored and maintained websites that include
immediate posting of opinions issued by appellate courts.3 The creation
of judicial websites has resulted in development of a vendor neutral
citation format serving as an alternative to the traditional citation to
printed materials.4 Non-profit, non-judicial research tools are also avail-
able on the Internet, and some legal research can be accomplished through
general search engines, such as HotBot, Google, and now Google Scholar,
which is devoted to academic research, including some legal research that
will likely expand in the future.
Moreover, not only do lawyers and courts now routinely rely on digital
research capabilities for legal research, but the use of information
concepts are processed, despite the fact that legal education grows more isolated from
legal practice. He concludes:
So mix a technology that provides wide-ranging information, a new breed of users,
and an academic setting that is separating itself from the actual practice of law, and
one creates information anarchy. Thisjumble is fast coming to resemble the world
of chaotic legal information that Blackstone found. Sound crazy? Think it through.
The old classification system of West topic and key numbers can be an important
element in research, but they no longer define the reality of legal thinking. The new
generation of researchers is governed bythe algorithms of its search engines. There
is simply too much stuff to sort through. No one can write a comprehensive treatise
any more, and no one can read all of the new cases. Machines are sorting for us.
We need a new set of thinkable thoughts.
Id. at 314.
2 See Lynn Foster & Bruce Kennedy, Technological Developments in Legal
Research, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCEss 275, 279-83 (2000) (discussing the impact of
technological change, including online data bases, on legal research).
'See Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Ronald W. Staudt, The 1% Solution: American Judges
MustEnter the InternetAge, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 463,467 (2000) ("Most federal
circuits have web sites publishing the full text of their opinions. A rapidly growing
number of state appeals courts are doing the same .... ").
4 See, e.g., Coleen M. Barger, The Uncertain Status of Citation Reform: An Update
for the Undecided, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESs 59 (1999). An example is the publication
and citation format employed by the New Mexico courts in which appellate opinions
are cited by year of issuance, issuing court, the number of the opinion in the sequence
of opinions issued by the state supreme court or court of appeals. Pinpoint citation is
to the numbered paragraph of the opinion. E.g., State v. Martinez-Rodriguez, 33 P.3d
267 (N.M. 2001).
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available through Internet sources in the litigation process has become
more common.5 The use of non-traditional sources of information has
created problems precisely because digital data is subject to alteration,
disappearance from the Internet,6 and often lack of verification.7
The existence of digital research alternatives raises substantive issues,
such as the designation of opinions as "unpublished" by appellate courts
that continue the practice of proscribing citation to those opinions, even
though they are now readily available through online sources.8 Over the
' The importance of Internet citation by appellate courts as a factor in appellate
decision making is demonstrated by the fact that it is now studied. See, e.g., William
H. Manz, The Citation Practices of the New York Court of Appeals: A Millennium
Update, 49 BUFF. L. REv. 1273, 1312 n.104 (2001).
A search in the Westlaw "Allstates" database for 1999-Mar. 2001 using "http" as
a search term found that the New Jersey Supreme Court led in citations to material
on the Internet with twenty-one. The numbers of citations by top state courts other
than New York and New Jerseywere as follows: no cites: 20; one cite: 12; two cites:
8; three cites: 3; four cites: 2; five cites: 2; seven cites: 1. There were two Internet
cites by the Supreme Court in 1999, and seven in 2000. As with LEXIS and West-
law, it is possible that additional material was located using electronic research but
was then cited to the print version, in accord with The Bluebook. THE BLUEBOOK:
A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 15.2 (b) at 131 (Columbia Law Review Ass'n
et a]. eds., 18th ed. 2005).
Id.
6 Nearly a decade ago, editors of one law review noted the problems associated with
citation to Internet sources in its articles. See Symposium, The Development and Prac-
tice of Law in the Age of the Internet, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 327, 346 (1996).
The American University Law Review has supplemented the Bluebook citation to
Internet sources because of the transient nature of the medium.... The Law Review
retains file copies of all Internet sources so that readers may obtain sources that may
have been online at the time an article was published, but that may no longer be
available at a future date.
Id. at 346 n.81 (emphasis added).
7For a provocative examination ofthe problem ofreliability of online data generally,
including problems with citation to Intemet-based information, see Coleen M. Barger,
On the Internet, Nobody Knows You're a Judge: Appellate Courts' Use of Internet
Materials, 4 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 417 (2002).
'Philip A. Talmadge, New Technologies and Appellate Practice, 2 J. APP. PRAC.
& PROCESS 363, 372 (2000). Justice Talmadge, of the Washington Supreme Court,
observes:
It is difficult to make a distinction between a published and unpublished opinion
disseminated over the Internet. New terminology will be required. Plainly all of the
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past several years, the dominant controversy in appellate practice has
involved the continuing prohibition in many jurisdictions against using
unpublished appellate opinions in subsequent litigation.9
Ironically, the same force that pressed forward the publication-citation
debate, digital publication of judicial opinions resulting in increased
accessibility, has resulted in a less-studied aspect of the changing nature
of legal research and practice.° The speed with which appellate opinions
opinions disseminated through the Internet are "published," but the real issue is whe-
ther or not they have precedential value. Appellate courts should eschew the "pub-
lished/unpublished" terminology in favor of "precedential/non-precedential"
opinions.
Id.
9 For a discussion of the professional, judicial, and academic debate on the question
of citation prohibitions, see Stephen R. Barnett, From Anastasoff to Hart to West's
Federal Appendix: The Ground Shifts Under No-Citation Rules, 4 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 1 (2002); Stephen R. Barnett, No Citation Rules Under Siege: A Battlefield
Report and Analysis, 5 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS 473 (2003). Although the questions
concerning use ofunpublished opinions by appellate courts have been considered previ-
ously, the current stage of debate is attributable to the position advanced by late Senior
Circuit Judge Richard S. Arnold of the Eighth Circuit, first in his essay, Unpublished
Opinions: A Comment, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 219 (1999), and then in his opinion
for the panel in Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, vacated as moot en banc,
235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000). In both, Judge Arnold argued that the Article IIIjudicial
power of the United States Constitution did not authorize the characterization of
appellate opinions as lacking precedential value by virtue of their status as "unpub-
lished." The debate has featured academic comment in scholarly reviews, such as Anas-
tasoff, Unpublished Opinions, and "No-Citation " Rules, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS
169 (2001), which includes eleven essays and articles addressing publication issues and
prohibitions against citing unpublished opinions. The debate has also focused on judicial
discussion in both opinions and professional publications. See, e.g, Hart v. Massanari,
266 F.3d 1155, 1180 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that "Article III [does not] require[] that
all case dispositions and orders issued by appellate courts be binding authority"); see
also Alex Kozinski & Stephen Reinhardt, Please Don't Cite This!, 20 CAL. LAW. 43
(June 2000).
The debate has led to proposed amendment of Rule 32.1 of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure to permit citation to all judicial opinions, regardless of their pub-
lication status. Judicial Conference Approves Rule Changes on E-Discovery, Unpub-
lished Opinion Citation, 74 U.S.L.W. 2168 (Sept. 27, 2005) (reporting the action of
the Judicial Conference of the United States that would, prospectively, override court
rules in four circuits still barring citation to unpublished opinions).
0 In fact, the process has been studied. See, e.g., Kenneth H. Ryesky, From Pens
to Pixels: Text-Media Issues in Promulgating, Archiving, and Using Judicial Opinions,
4 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS 353 (2002) (providing a thorough and quite interesting
history of the transformation of the process of disseminating judicial opinions).
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can now be disseminated has seemingly increased the potential for
infection of error in the litigation process attributable to editing error in
the appellate process." Along with the almost immediate general
availability of appellate opinions, the sheer rapidity of dissemination
means that traditional processes of refinement may be lost, at least
temporarily. 12 This prospect should be of particular concern to trial
counsel relying on recently released opinions available through digital
research tools, to trial courts making decisions based on citation ofnewly
released opinions, and to the appellate courts themselves. Appellate
judges should recognize the potential harm from imprecision in the
opinion writing process itself because the speed with which decisions are
now "reported," whether designated for publication in the reporter system
or not, necessarily requires trial lawyers and trial courts to be aware of
the most recent expressions of law on any particular point relevant to the
case being litigated.
I. Correction, Revision, or Re-issuance
of Appellate Opinions: "Now You See It...
But Maybe Not Later"
Appellate courts have traditionally been able to use the issuance of
advance sheets by official and unofficial reporters as a means of expedit-
ing the publication of appellate opinions. An important side effect of the
" Ryesky, supra note 10, at 404.
Prior to the printing press, each hand-scribed book or other literary work was a
unique creation, subject to textual variations from one specimen to the next. With
the advent of the printing press, the individual books from the entire press run
became textually identical. Likewise, photocopying processes, xerographic or
otherwise, faithfully and accurately reproduce the text of the original. But modem
on-demand printing technology now allows, for good or evil purposes, textual
variations between press runs of the same edition, and indeed, variations of
individual books within a single production run.
Id. (citations omitted).
2 See Stephen L. Wasby, A Judicial Secretary's Many Roles: Working With an
Appellate Judge and Clerks, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 151, 155 (1005) (noting the
role of one judge's secretary in serving as an intermediary between chambers and West
Publishing when requesting a delay in release of an opinion requiring correction).
20051
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issuance of unbound advance sheets has been that the availability of a
newly issued appellate opinion in paper form permits correction before
the opinion is "finalized" in the publication process by being included
in the bound volumes of the official and unofficial reporters.
Sometimes, appellate courts have even notified readers that they
should expect revisions to appear. For example, in Tasini v. New York
Times Co., the Second Circuit initially issued an opinion published in the
advance sheets of the Federal Reporter in an important copyright case. 3
The court held that an author retains copyright interest in an article
originally published as a "freelance" article when it is disseminated in
electronic databases made available for the public. 4 The district court
had ruled for the publishers, characterizing these articles as "collected
works" under the Copyright Act. 5 After issuing its initial opinion revers-
ing the district court, however, the Second Circuit issued a warning that
its initial opinion had been withdrawn and stated that another opinion may
be filed at a later date.' 6 A superceding opinion was, in fact, later filed.' 7
The notice was important in alerting litigants and interested readers
that the circuit court was in the process of reconsidering its initial decision
with potentially far-reaching consequences. Although the court's
superceding opinion reached the same result, and one affirmed by the
13 192 F.3d 356, 1999 WL 753966 (2d Cir. Sept. 24, 1999), superseded by 206 F.3d
161 (2d Cir. 2000). A Westlaw search for this document will lead to the revised opinion
at 206 F.3d 161. The original opinion remains available on Westlaw.
14 Tasini, 1999 WL 753996, at *4.
Tasini v. N.Y. Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804, 826-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (applying
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 20 1(c) (1994)), rev'd, 206 F.3d 161 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted, 531 U.S. 978 (2000), aff'd, 533 U.S. 483 (2001)).
16 Tasini, 1999 WL 753996, at *1. The Westlawversion advises before the opinion
begins:
Editor's Note: The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit,
in Tasini v. New York Times Co., Inc., published in the advance sheet at this citation,
192 F.3d 356, was withdrawn from the bound volume at the request of the court.
For superseding opinion, see 206 F.3d 161.
Id. The same notice appears in the bound volume on a page denoted as 356-66. The
ten pages originally devoted to the Tasini opinion were deleted from the bound volume.
"7 Tasini v. N.Y. Times Co., 206 F.3d 161, 170 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 531 U.S.
978 (2000), aff'd, 533 U.S. 483 (2001).
[Vol. 29:81
THE PERILS OF ONLINE LEGAL RESEARCH
United States Supreme Court," the litigation demonstrates the potential
problem posed when appellate courts find it necessary to revise their
thinking after issuance of an initial decision. The superceding opinion
in Tasini provided a more detailed rationale for the circuit court's holding
with regard to the publication practices of the individual defendants. But
the court's notice that its initial opinion would be treated as withdrawn
provided litigants, counsel, and the public with no clear directive that the
issues would be resolved in the same way. Consequently, for the period
of time between the notice that the initial opinion had been withdrawn
and issuance of the superceding opinion, counsel and interested parties
may well have simply been unable to predict exactly what the court
intended to do.
The Tasini litigation demonstrates the potential lack of certainty in the
interpretation or application of law that may result from an appellate
court's determination that an initial opinion should be altered. Of course,
the same problem arises when a panel opinion is overruled by an en banc
court, as illustrated by the rehearing in United States v. Singleton,9 litiga-
tion in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals notable for the dramatic initial
holding by the panel that the government was precluded from obtaining
testimony from reluctant witnesses through the use of benefits offered
to the witnesses in return for an agreement to testify. In Singleton, how-
ever, the panel opinion was so obviously controversial that, within ten
days, the circuit court noted that rehearing had been granted in the case,
and a notice to this effect was included with the online panel opinion.2"
Sometimes, an appellate court's decision in altering an initial opinion
may be designed to address an issue other than its original rationale.
Thus, in McCoy v. State,2' the Alaska Court of Appeals revised its initial
opinion published in the Pacific Reporter.22 The court initially included
's N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001).
'9 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998), rev'den banc, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999).
20 Id. at 1361-62. The circuit court issued its order granting rehearing and directing
the parties to brief potential collateral issues of retroactive and prospective application
of the panel holding on July 10, 1998. The panel decision was issued on July 1, 1998.
The decision of the circuit court overruling the panel was issued on January 8, 1999.
21 80 P.3d 751 (Alaska Ct. App.), reh 'ggranted, 80 P.3d 757 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
22McCoy v. State, 59 P.3d 747 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002). The text of the opinion no
longer appears in Westlaw's online database. Instead, the reader is advised that the
opinion has been reissued and is published at 80 P.3d 751, 755, 757.
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in its single opinion its separate opinions affirming the trial court's
judgment, denying rehearing, and prohibiting citation to unpublished
opinions by way of Judge Mannheimer's separate opinion addressing the
question of citation to prior, unpublished court opinions under the state's
"no citation" rule.23
In revising its opinion at Volume 80 of Pacific 3d, the court elected
to divide the three-part opinion into separate opinions with separate page
citations. There appears to be no substantive difference in the initial
published opinion contained in Volume 59 and the superceding opinions
published in Volume 80. The court's action might be explained by the
likelihood that Judge Mannheimer's separate opinion,24 which addressed
the operation of the "no citation" rule, will probably have more far reach-
ing implications for future litigants-suggesting greater frequency of
citation-than the disposition of the McCoy case that allowed the trial court
to consider the defendant'sjuvenile record when meting out punishment.2 5
Finally, uncertainty in the system is created by institutional procedures
in place in some jurisdictions in which intermediate appellate court
decisions are "depublished" by superior courts.26 In reality, this process
suggests no greater immediate threat to counsel's ability to predict the
interpretation or application of a particular point of law than discretionary
review of a lower court's appellate decision.27 When discretionary review
3 These three opinions are included in the bound volume of the Pacific Reporter.
24 McCoy v. State, 80 P.3d 757 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
2S Id. at 751. If that is so, however, the court might well have explained its reason
for revising the initial opinion so that lawyers and law review cite checkers will be spared
the need to make verbatim comparisons in an effort to determine what, if any, substantive
changes were intended or made.
26 See, e.g., Joseph R. Grodin, The Depublication Practice ofthe California Supreme
Court, 72 CAL. L. REV. 514, 522 (1984) (discussing depublication used by state supreme
court when lower court reaches the correct result using questionable or incorrect
rationale); Steven B. Katz, California 's Curious Practice of "Pocket Review," 3 J. APP.
PRAC. & PROCESS 385, 386 (2001) (discussing depublished opinions not citable as
precedent under CAL. R. CT. 976(c)(1) (West 2001)); Michael A. Berch, Analysis of
Arizona's Depublication Rule and Practice, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 175 (2000).
27 For example, by rule, published opinions of the Oklahoma Court of Appeals are
denied precedential value until formally adopted by the Oklahoma Supreme Court.
OKLA. Sup. CT. R. 1.200(c)(2) (2000); see Cimarron Fed. Say. Ass'n v. Jones, 832 P.2d
420, 1992 OK 55 (1992) (adopting opinion of court of appeals, 832 P.2d 426, 1991 OK
CIV APP 67 (Ct. App. 1991)).
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is granted, however, typically the higher court decides the question
presented and issues an opinion designed to guide citizens and counsel
in understanding the law.
II. Error in Online Versions
of Judicial Opinions: "What You See
May Not Be What You Get"
A worst case scenario of online access is presented when an appellate
opinion, digitally issued and electronically accessed, contains an error of
law. Unfortunately, the systems of digital access are not without the
potential for error, and the speed with which decisions may be published
online after being issued occasionally draws problems.28
In September of 2001, Arkansas attorneys arguing for defensive jury
instructions in a capital murder trial29 encountered the unusual situation
in which different sources for controlling caselaw provided different rules
governing a key issue for the defense. The range of lesser-included
offenses in a capital felony murder charge under state law was in issue.3 °
28 For instance, in Larkin v. Larkin, the court observed that an unpublished opinion
had been issued by the appellate court in another cause, "seemingly supportive of the
trial court here," but had been withdrawn four days later, only to be followed by another
unpublished opinion in a different cause some two months later which reached a different
result, consistent with that ofLarkin. The court noted "it is conceivable some confusion
could have resulted before and at oral argument," and denied attorney's fees to the
prevailing party. No. C6-87-2231, 1988 WL 31404, at *2 (Minn. App. Apr. 5, 1988).
29 State v. James Fisher, No. CR-2001-1 (Franklin County, Charleston Dist., Ark.
Sept. 17-21, 2001).
3 Arkansas law provides forjury consideration of lesser-included offenses by statute.
A defendant maybe convicted of one offense included in another offense with which
he has been charged. An offense is so included if:
(1) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the elements required to
establish the commission of the offense charged; or
(2) It consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or to commit an offense
otherwise included within it; or
(3) It differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious injury
or risk of injury to the same person, property, or public interest or a lesser kind
of culpable mental state suffices to establish its commission.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-110(b) (Michie 1997). "The court shall not be obligated to
charge the jury with respect to an included offense unless there is a rational basis for
2005]
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Defense counsel moved for lesser-included offense instructions on
second-degree murder and manslaughter, but the trial court denied both
on the basis of recent decisions issued by the Arkansas Supreme Court.
Under Arkansas law, a lesser-included offense instruction on first-
degree felony murder must be given in all capital felony murder prosecu-
a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the
included offense." Id. § 5-1-110(c).
Subsection 5-1-110(b)(1) sets out the test for lesser-included offense analysis using
the long-standing elements analysis originally applied to prior jeopardy claims in
Blockburger v. United States. 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). The test looks to the elements
of offenses. If each offense requires proof of an element not required for proof of the
other, the two offenses are not the same for double jeopardy purposes. Id. However,
if the elements are identical, or if all of the elements for proof of one are included in
the other, the offenses are the same for double jeopardy purposes. In the latter instance,
the offense requiring proof of an additional element is typically considered the greater
offense, while the other is the lesser-included offense. See also Sansone v. United States,
380 U.S. 343,349-50 (1965) (applying the lesser-included offense analysis). The typical
example of an elements-based lesser-included offense is presented when the accused
is charged with an aggravated or armed robbery. This offense is usually distinguished
from robbery by the additional element ofproof that the defendant committed the offense
while using a deadly weapon or threatening the use of a deadly weapon or physical
violence in order to effect the robbery. If there is evidence in the record on which ajury
could rationally conclude that the defendant neither used nor threatened use ofa weapon
or serious injury, the trial court should instruct the jury on the lesser offense of simple
robbery if requested by either party. See Hamilton v. State, 556 S.W.2d 884, 888-89
(Ark. 1977).
Subsection 5-1-1 10(b)(2) recognizes perhaps the most obvious situation in which
the lesser-included offense issue arises, although an interesting point is often raised with
regard to whether the evidence could rationally give rise to either of two competing
inferences. If the evidence (apart from the accused's own testimony) gives rise to the
inference that the offense of burglary was only attempted, that inference almost
necessarily means that the objective evidence would require acquittal on the burglary
charge because, by definition, the offense was not completed. It would seem that the
objective evidence could not support either of these conclusions ifproof of an unlawful
entry was required for conviction for burglary and the physical evidence shows only an
attempt to gain entry without consent.
Subsection 5-1-11 0(b)(3) describes the situation in which the severity ofthe offense
is graded based on the degree of injury to a person or property, or the same act may be
comnmitted with greater or lesser degrees of culpability. For instance, an intentional
homicide may constitute the basis for a murder charge, but if the actor is simply
"reckless" in committing the act, or if the actor commits the act while under the influence
of an "extreme emotional disturbance," the same act may only support a conviction for
manslaughter. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-104(a)(1) & (3) (Michie 1997); Robinson v.
State, 598 S.W.2d 421, 424 (Ark. 1980) (finding that evidence of the defendant's
disoriented state of mind was sufficient to warrant instructions on lesser-included
offenses in murder prosecution), appeal after remand at 624 S.W.2d 435 (Ark. 1981).
[Vol. 29:81
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tions.3" But the Arkansas Supreme Court determined in Brown v. State
that a lesser-included offense instruction on second-degree murder was
not available when charged with felony murder, based on its analysis of
the elements defining second-degree murder.32 In a subsequent decision
in Hill v. State, the court concluded that manslaughter similarly was not
a lesser-included offense under a charge of felony murder.3 The court
reasoned that both second-degree murder 4 and manslaughter offenses,35
as defined by state law, required proof of a culpable mental state, whereas
" Rhodes v. State, 716 S.W.2d 758, 761 (Ark. 1986). This rule is necessitated by
the overlapping provisions of the capital felony murder and first-degree felony murder
statutes. The latter permits conviction on proof of a homicide committed during the
commission of any felony, while the former authorizes conviction and subjects the
accused to possible penalty of death only upon proofofhomicide committed during cer-
tain inherently dangerous felonies prescribed by statute. Compare ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 5-10-101(a)(1) (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2003) (identifying underlying felonies as ter-
rorism, rape, kidnapping, vehicular piracy, robbery, burglary, delivery of a controlled
substance or first-degree escape) and (2) (underlying felony of arson), with id. § 5-10-
102(a)(1) (defining first-degree felony murder as homicide committed under circum-
stances "manifesting extreme indifference to the value ofhuman life" while in the course
of committing or attempting to commit a felony) (emphasis added).
The United States Supreme Court held in Hopkins v. Reeves that state courts are not
required to instruct on lesser-included offenses in capital prosecutions if no lesser-
included offenses to the capital crime-there, capital felony murder-are recognized under
state law. 524 U.S. 88 (1998). The holding limits the application ofBeck v. Alabama,
in which the Court had held that failure to instruct on an applicable lesser-included
offense in a state capital prosecution violated Eighth Amendment protections relating
to use of the death penalty and Fourteenth Amendment due process protections. 447
U.S. 625, 632 (1980).
32 929 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Ark. 1996).
33 40 S.W.3d 751, 755-56 (Ark. 2001). The current version of Hill available on
Westlaw continues to include incorrect references to second-degree felony murder in
Headnotes [ 1] and [2] discussed in this Article, although the text of the opinion has been
corrected.
34 Under Arkansas law, "[a] person commits murder in the second degree if. .. [h]e
knowingly causes the death ofanother person under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to the value of human life; or ... [w]ith the purpose of causing serious
physical injury to another person, he causes the death of any person." ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 5-10-103(a) (Michie 1997).
31 Under Arkansas law, "[a] person commits manslaughter if.... [a]cting alone or
with one (1) or more persons, he commits or attempts to commit a felony, and in the
course of and in furtherance of the felony or in immediate flight therefrom. ... [h]e or
an accomplice negligently causes the death of any person.... ." ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-
10-104(a) (Michie 1997).
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AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRIAL ADVOCACY
the criminal intent in a felony murder is supplied by proof of the actor's
intent to commit the underlying felony.36 Consequently, given its
approach to elements analysis, the court rejected characterization of
second-degree murder and manslaughter as lesser offenses of felony
murder, because each required proof of an element that felony murder
does not." It further rejected the alternative theories of lesser offenses
under state law,3" because the death of the victim necessary for proof of
36 Brown, 929 S.W.2d at 148; Hill, 40 S.W.3d at 755. The Hill court also ignored
the alternative theory of manslaughter in the statute that provides for conviction upon
proof that the actor committed a reckless act resulting in death. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-
104(a)(3) (Michie 1997). Since the general culpability requirement provides for
conviction only upon proof that the actor acted "purposely, knowingly or recklessly,"
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-203(b) (Michie 1997), if the definition of the offense does not
include a specific culpable mental state, a reckless manslaughter charge would arguably
also offer the possible lesser-included offense rationale for felony murder. But see Ellis
v. State, 47 S.W. 3 d 259, 261-62 (Ark. 2001) (holding that reckless manslaughter would
not be an appropriate lesser-included offense of first-degree purposeful murder based
on the fact the accused shot the victim only once from a distance of three to five feet,
that evidence alone being insufficient to demonstrate that he acted recklessly in causing
the victim's death).
37 Brown, 929 S.W.2d at 148; Hill, 40 S.W.3d at 755. Arguably, the court incorrectly
interpreted Arkansas law with regard to the requirement for proofof the culpable mental
state ina felony murder prosecution. Arkansas law provides that, "[i]f a statute defining
an offense prescribes a culpable mental state and does not clearly indicate that the
culpable mental state applies to less than all the elements of the offense, the prescribed
culpable mental state applies to each element of the offense." ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-
203(a) (Michie 1997).
Neither the capital felony murder statutory provisions, ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-
101 (a)(1) (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2003) (specifying capital murder as committed during
the commission or attempted commission of terrorism, rape, kidnapping, vehicular
piracy, robbery, burglary, felony violation of the Controlled Substances Act, or first-
degree escape) or (2) (specifying murder committed during commission of arson), nor
first-degree murder, ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-102(a)(1) (Michie 1997) (murder during
commission or attempted commission of any felony), prescribes a culpable mental state
for the felony murder itself. When a statute does not provide a culpable mental state,
however, section 5-2-203(b) states that, "culpability is nonetheless required and is
established only if a person acts purposely, knowingly, or recklessly." Consequently,
the Arkansas Supreme Court's conclusion that the only required culpable mental state
required for proof of felony murder is that required for proof of the underlying or
predicate felony may actually be in conflict with the statutory requirement for proof of
all elements of the offense charged-the murder itself. This construction would appear
to undermine the traditional rationale for the felony murder offense but may be
technically required by a proper reading of the Arkansas statutes.
38 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-110(b) (Michie 1997); see supra note 30 (reciting the text
of the statute).
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manslaughter indicated that a lesser injury was not involved in the
offense, nor was there evidence even arguably supporting an inference
that there was an attempted offense.39
Unfortunately, counsel preparing for the capital murder trial in
September, 2001, were confronted by different versions of the Arkansas
Supreme Court's opinion in Hill. The Hill court had incorrectly included
dicta in its opinion suggesting that "second-degree felony murder" is an
offense under Arkansas law. At least, it did so in some versions of its
opinion.
The official printed advance sheet version of the opinion included three
references to "second-degree felony murder." First, Headnote 2 stated
that "first-degree felony murder and second-degree felony murder are
lesser-included offenses of capital felony murder."40 Furthermore, in the
text of the opinion, the court observed: "No instruction on second-degree
felony murder was sought or given."41 And finally, in discussing the
culpable mental state or mens rea required for felony murder, which the
court found related only to proof of the underlying felony, the court also
noted: "The same holds true for first-degree felony murder and second-
degreefelony murder, which qualify as lesser included offenses of capital
felony murder."'42
The same language, referring to "second-degree felony murder,"
appeared in the online version of the opinion posted on the website
maintained by the Arkansas Supreme Court.43 Similarly, the same
language was included in the online version of the opinion published by
LexisNexis."
However, the online and advance sheet version of Hill issued by
Westlaw did not contain the same language used by the court in referring
'9 Hill, 40 S.W.3d at 755.
o Id. at 751. Arkansas continues to publish official reports and issue advance sheets
for its official reporter.
41 Hill, 40 S.W.3d at 754.
42 Id. at 755 (emphasis added).
43 The text was originally located at Hill v. State, No. CR 00-921, at ** 1,5 & 6 (Ark.
Mar. 22, 2001), available at http://courts.state.ar.us/opinions/corrections.html, but on
December 10, 2001, the opinion was corrected to delete the references to "second-degree
murder."
"Hill v. State, No. CR 00-921, 2001 Ark. LEXIS 182, at *7 (Ark. Mar. 22, 2001).
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to "second-degree felony murder." The Westlaw and Southwestern
Reporter advance sheet versions retained a reference to "second-degree
felony murder" in Headnote 2. 4 5 However, there are significant differ-
ences in the text of the decision between the Westlaw versions published
online and in the advance sheets46 when compared to the official and
LexisNexis versions. The Westlaw versions deleted the reference to lack
of a request for an instruction on "second-degree felony murder. 47 The
court's reference to "first-degree and second-degree felony murder" as
qualifying as "lesser-included offenses of capital felony murder" in the
text of the opinion were also corrected in both the online and advance
sheet versions published by Westlaw: "The same holds true for first-
degree felony murder, which qualifies as a lesser included offense of
capital felony murder."'4
Even when presented with the advance sheet version of Hill in the
official reports, the trial judge refused to give a lesser-included offense
instruction on second-degree murder, concluding that the express holding
in Brown controlled over the dicta in the later opinion in Hill.49 Compli-
cating the situation faced by counsel was the existence of a uniform jury
instruction, approved bythe Arkansas Supreme Court, which specifically
provided for use of a lesser-included offense instruction on manslaughter
in capital felony murder cases.50 Arkansas Model Criminal Instructions
(AMCI) authorize jurors, in an applicable capital felony murder case, to
41 Hill, 40 S.W.3d at 751.
' Id. This version was printed in the traditional advance sheet format on September
27, 2001.
41 Hill, 40 S.W.3d at 755.
48 Id.
41 Id. The confusion in the differing versions was cleared up by Bill Jones, the
Official Reporter of Decisions for the State of Arkansas. He explained that the opinion
had been corrected by the authoring judge but was concerned that the corrections had
not immediately been included on the official website. Apparently, the Attorney
General's office, noting the potential Brown-Hill conflict, called it to the attention of
the court, but at a time when multiple sources of legal information are available, failure
to ensure complete correction can be troubling. Telephone Interview with Bill Jones,
Official Reporter of Arkansas Decisions (Oct. 29, 2001).
50 ARKANSAS MODEL CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS 2D 1006 (Michie 1994) [hereinafter
AMCI].
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consider both first-degree felony murder and manslaughter as lesser-
included offenses. The model instruction provides, in pertinent part:
The difference between murder in the first degree and manslaughter is that
in murder in the first degree the death of__ (victim) must have been
caused under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life,
but in manslaughter the death of (victim) must have been caused
"negligently" (as that term has been denied for you). Of course, all other
elements of either crime must be proved, but the difference between them
is what I have just explained.5"
This instruction builds on the model instruction for manslaughter,
generally.52 The court's opinion in Hill noted the existence of AMCI
1004 in observing that Hill had tendered a requested instruction on
manslaughter as a lesser-included offense.53 Yet the Hill court never
discussed why the model instruction on manslaughter it had authorized
was not applicable, given the specific transitional instruction approved
with the adoption of AMCI 1006. In fact, the court proceeded with its
analysis of the elements of felony murder and manslaughter without
further discussion of model instructions 1004 or 1006 at all.54
Under Arkansas law, a trial judge is obligated to give an official model
instruction if one exists that properly states applicable law." Only if the
SIId.
52AMCI 2D 1004. This instruction provides, in pertinent part:
__ (Defendant(s)) [is] [are] charged with the offense of manslaughter. To
sustain this charge the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that:
(d) [(Acting alone or with one or more persons) _ (Defendant(s))
(committed) (or) (attempted to commit) _ (applicable felony), and in the
course of and in furtherance of that crime (or in immediate flight therefrom):
(1) ([He] [they] [or] [a person acting with (him) (them) (defendant[s])
negligently caused the death of_ _ (victim).
Id. This model instruction tracks the statutory language of the manslaughter offense
in the Arkansas Criminal Code. See Brown, 929 S.W.2d at 148.
" Hill, 40 S.W.3d at 753-54; see also AMCI 2D 1004.
4 Hill, 40 S.W.3d at 755-56.
" In re Ark. Model Crim. Instructions, 264 Ark. Appx. 967 (1979) (per curiam).
This order directed that "the AMCI instruction shall be used unless the trial judge finds
that it does not accurately state the law. In that event he will state his reasons for
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trial court finds the model instruction to be in error can it depart from the
authorized instructions. 6 Based on the Arkansas Supreme Court's
opinion in Hill, the trial court declined to give a lesser-included offense
instruction on felony manslaughter."
refusing the AMCI instruction." Id. The note on use to AMCI 2D 1006 specifically
provides that the bracketed clause set out in the text "should be given only if the court
has defined the term 'negligently' in its manslaughter instruction." AMCI 2D 1006 note
on use. Thus, the only theory of manslaughter that is applicable as a lesser-included
offense in a capital or first-degree felony murder prosecution is an act negligently
causing the death ofan individual in the course ofcommission or attempted commission
of a felony. ARK. CODEANN. § 5-10-104(a)(4)(A) (Michie 2001). Arguably, the trial
court could have declined the instruction on the theory that the victim's death was not
caused negligently, but rather intentionally, in which case the prosecution's felony
murder theory was not supported by the evidence.
6 Conley v. State, 607 S.W.2d 328, 330 (Ark. 1980) (stating "[i]f Arkansas Model
Criminal Instructions (AMCI) contains an instruction applicable in a criminal case, and
the trial judge determines that the jury should be instructed on the subject, the AMCI
instruction shall be used unless the trial judge finds that it does not accurately state the
law. In that event he will state his reasons for refusing the AMCI instruction").
" Fisher, No. CR-2000 1-1. The Arkansas Supreme Court's decision in Hill is also
troubling because the court simply failed to account for the felony manslaughter statute
the General Assembly had adopted and upon which AMCI 2D 1006 was predicated.
Even assuming that felony manslaughter would fail under the court's analysis of
Arkansas lesser-included offense law, the existence of the felony manslaughter statute
demonstrates that two different statutes proscribed the same conduct, at least in certain
circumstances. In such a case, the doctrine of lenity typically applies to require that the
accused be prosecuted under the less onerous provision. But the rule of lenity is not
favored, as the United States Supreme Court made clear in Smith v. United States. 508
U.S. 223, 239 (1993) ("Finally, the dissent and petitioner invoke the rule of lenity. The
mere possibility of articulating a narrower construction, however, does not by itselfimake
the rule of lenity applicable. Instead, that venerable rule is reserved for cases where,
'after 'seiz[ing] every thing from which aid can be derived," the Court is 'left with an
ambiguous statute."') (citations omitted).
Alternatively, the court might have considered whether the felony manslaughter and
felony murder statutes reflect a relatively common problem that arises when two different
provisions address the same subject, one generally and one specifically. In Lawson v.
State, the Arkansas Supreme Court stated that the more specific statute will control over
the general provision:
We have long recognized the familiar principle that where a special act applies to
a particular case, it excludes the operation of a general act upon the same subject.
We have also always recognized the principle that penal laws should be strictly
construed, that all doubts in construing a criminal statute must be resolved in favor
of the defendant ....
746 S.W.2d 544, 546 (Ark. 1988) (citations omitted).
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The recognition that manslaughter would constitute an appropriate
lesser-included offense under certain facts, as evidenced by the model
instruction on point, would further suggest that second-degree murder
should have been viewed as an acceptable intermediate lesser-included
offense in the steps down from capital felony murder to felony man-
slaughter. The Brown court may have correctly concluded that the
culpable mental state of "knowingly" in the second-degree murder statute,
which describes a murder committed with "extreme indifference to the
value of human life," requires proof of a greater degree of intent than
required for conviction for felony murder, which provides for no element
of knowledge or intent at all. However, the Brown court's second-degree
murder analysis was too narrow and its conclusion too broad. Brown
addressed only one statutory theory of second-degree murder in rejecting
the requested instruction presented." Alternatively, Arkansas law permits
conviction on second-degree murder for an act done with intent to cause
serious injury that results in death.59 In at least some cases, an act done
However, with respect to both lines of argument, it is reasonably safe to say that the
felony manslaughter statute is more specific only to the extent that it addresses negligent
homicide, rather than something approaching a deliberate act clearly evident in many
felony murder prosecutions. This reality suggests that the felony murder doctrine itself
may have served its usefulness, as some courts and commentators have suggested. See,
e.g., People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 134 (Cal. 1965) (en banc) ("To invoke the
felony-murder doctrine to imply malice in such a case is unnecessary and overlooks the
principles of criminal liability that should govern the responsibility of one person for
a killing committed by another."); People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304,328 (Mich. 1980)
(abolishing felony murder doctrine in Michigan due to "harshness and inequity" in
"violat[ing] the basic premise of individual moral culpability"); Michael J. Roman,
"Once More Unto the Breach, Dear Friends, Once More ": A Call to Re-Evaluate the
Felony-MurderDoctrine in Wisconsin in the Wake ofState v. Oimen and State v. Rivera,
77 MARQ. L. REV. 785, 821 (1994) (noting that "[n]early all ... commentary is deroga-
tory to the [felony murder] doctrine"); James W. Hilliard, Felony Murder in Illinois-The
"Agency Theory" vs. the "Proximate Cause Theory ": The Debate Continues, 25 S. ILL.
U. L.J. 331, 343 (2001) ("Courts and 'commentators have 'almost universally con-
demned' the felony murder rule.' It 'has been the subject of vitriolic criticism for
centuries.' Indeed, 'the criticism levelled against the doctrine 'constitutes a lexicon of
everything that scholars and jurists can find wrong with a legal doctrine.' 'There are,
however, a few defenders of the doctrine, although they are significantly outnumbered
in the literature."') (citations omitted); James J. Tomkovicz, The Endurance of the
Felony-Murder Rule: A Study of the Forces that Shape Our Criminal Law, 51 WASH.
&LEEL. REV. 1429, 1430 n.8 (1994).
5'929 S.W.2d at 147-48.
59 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-103(a)(2) (Michie 2001).
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in the course of committing a felony designed to cause serious injury will
result in death and should support a conviction for second-degree murder.
Time is often limited at trial, and decisions must be made on the basis
of the best information available. Given competing versions of the same
text, trial counsel are understandably likely to rely on a version furthering
the interests of their clients. The problem posed in the trial discussed here
was accentuated when jurors sent out a note during deliberations asking
if there was any other less serious offense they might consider.' The trial
court correctly limited the jury's options under what ultimately proved
to be the official statement of Arkansas law at the time.
Ironically, Brown and Hill were subsequently overruled in McCoy v.
State, where the Arkansas Supreme Court "receded" from those and other
decisions that had excluded lesser-included offenses not predicated on
a strict elements analysis.6' The defendants in the instant case, having
been issued relatively light sentences upon conviction for first-degree
felony murder, elected to waive their appeals, thus forfeiting any benefit
from the subsequent change in the law announced in McCoy.62
This scenario reflects but a single instance of difficulty occasioned by
existence of alternate sources of case law, delivered or accessed in
different formats.63 What is true about online databases is that correction
likely involves the deliberate removal of previously available
information." The reality of the ability to alter existing information is
0 Telephone Interview with Mark F. Hampton, Trial Counsel (Sept. 23, 2001).
61 69 S.W.3d 430 (Ark. 2002), on state's petition for review from 49 S.W.3d 154
(Ark. Ct. App. 2001). The court of appeals also reversed on direct appeal.
62 Telephone Interview with Mark F. Hampton, Trial Counsel (Sept. 27, 2001).
63 Even the traditional print format is hardly infallible. A LexisNexis version of the
Arkansas Criminal Code, 2001 edition, was published without the complete negligent
homicide statute. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-105 (1987). The statute, as published, left
out essential elements of the offense in the printed volume; it contained only sections
(a)(1)(A) and (a)(1)(B). LexisNexis subsequently supplied corrected copies of the
statute to be pasted into the softbound copies. The corrected copies contained, in
addition to the other (a) sections, (a)(2), (b)(1), (b)(2), and (c).
" See, e.g., J. Thomas Sullivan, Redefining Rehearing: "Previewing" Appellate
Decisions Online, 2 J. APp. PRAC. & PROCESS 435, 441-44 nn.17, 22 & 23 (2000)
(discussing the withdrawn opinion in Dodd v. State, 1999 OK CR 29, 1999 WL 521976
and substituted revised opinion on rehearing by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
at Dodd v. State, 993 P.2d 778 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000)).
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that reliance on digitally-reported legal authority is necessarily linked to
the accuracy of human activity in creating the information. Because of
the incredible speed with which such information is now transmitted and
made available, the potential for error resulting from lack of reflection
or editing is significant.65
Conclusions
New and developing technologies often only precipitate minor changes
in daily life. For trial and appellate lawyers, the impact of online publica-
tion ofjudicial opinions and availability of information in digital format
has clearly altered the dynamics of publication decisions and citation prac-
tice." What is almost certain is that diligent trial and appellate lawyers
will routinely search online databases for recent decisions that may affect
their clients' cases. To the extent that the immediacy of information
availability results in reliance on the most up-to-date appellate court dis-
position of legal issues, both courts and online publishers must strive to
accurately report appellate opinions.
Publishers can, in one sense, be no more reliable than the courts them-
selves. When appellate panels or courts err in the information presented
in their opinions, or when they determine that an opinion may need to be
altered in the rehearing process, they often interject uncertainty into the
legal system. This uncertainty compromises the ability of litigators to
65 When a Texas attorney sought sanctions for opposing counsel's reliance on an
opinion designated for publication but as yet unpublished, the appellate court rejected
the argument, holding that the publication designation permitted use of the opinion in
subsequent litigation. The court observed that, "if rule 90(i) were interpreted to require
actual publication, we would have to decide what 'publication' means, i.e., slip opinions
versus typeset advance sheets and bound books versus online computer services versus
compact disks." Bloch v. Dowell Schlumberger Inc., 925 S.W.2d 301,304 (Tex. App.
1996). The court also pointed out the particular relevance of the opinion in question,
noting that "[i]t is no small wonder Dowell has sought tenaciously to preclude the use
of [the prior decision]," because that decision was unfavorably dispositive of the issue
in the case. Id.
6 For instance, Iowa Rules ofAppellate Procedure permit citation to an unpublished
opinion in a brief, but require the party to attach a copy of the unpublished opinion to
the brief and to include "an electronic citation indicating where the opinion may be
readily accessed online." IOWA R. APP. P. 6.14(5)(b) (2004).
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provide accurate advice and trial courts to reach correct conclusions. The
technological revolution now altering the way lawyers and courts do their
work requires a continuing commitment to excellence and accuracy in
drafting and reporting appellate decisions. It is key that appellate courts
recognize the importance of the digital dissemination of their opinions
as a tool for practitioners and lower courts so that reliance on electroni-
cally accessed legal information is not compromised.
